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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Estate
of
JOHN WILLIAM INGRAM,

Case
No. 8542

Deceased

Respondents' Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts as set forth in the appellants' brief are substantially correct as far as the statement goes, but some
additions to the statement are made by respondent to
give the Court the view of respondents.
For many years before and after 1940 John William
Ingram, also known as J. W. Ingram, and Uncle Will,
lived near his brother, M. Smith Ingram, in Nephi, Utah.
He visited frequently with Smith Ingram and Smith's
1
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family, including the five children, Manila, Blain, Earl,
Bonnie and Kenneth; and all of whom were nice to him
and cared for and assisted him. He had been married
in 1938, but only for less than a month.
In May 1940, J. W. Ingram wrote a letter to his
niece, ~ianila Ingram Brock, named above, which has
been offered herein as Exhibit 1 and admitted to probate
by the trial court as the Olographic will of decedent, who
hereafter will be referred to as testator. By said will
whatever of his property was left was to be divided
equally between the above-named nieces and nephews.
The brother and sisters of the testator, other than
~I.

S. Ingram, had not visited with him; there had been

trouble, one not speaking, although living near. The other
brother and sisters are the objectors and appellants
herein who are endeavoring to obtain whatever property

J. W. Ingram left.
Eight days after said letter, testator executed deeds
to his real estate, reserving a life estate therein, and bill
of sale covering personal property, to :Manila and her
brother Blain. Thereafter other action was taken to
transfer other pro pert~· to

~lanila

and Blain.

The rpcords herein show that Attorney P. N. Ander:-;on assisted testator in the transfers of his poperty; that
he wa::; the attonwy who initiated this proceeding; and
that he passed away in the early stages hereof.
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THE EVIDENCE
The witness Paul E. Booth, manager of the Commercial Bank, Nephi office, testified that he had a conversation with John William Ingram, the testator, in which
Ingram said ''he was getting oid and his health was getting bad, he wanted to fix his accounts, wanted to leave his
accounts to his niece, Manila I. Brock." (Tr. 25) At first
he said the conversation was about 1940 or 1941, and on
re-checking testified that the conversation was on or
about January 16,1947, when a signature card was signed
in the bank. ( Tr. 44) He further testified that there was
a bank ledger sheet in the names "J. W. Ingram or Manila Brock''; that the account was opened December 9,
1939, and the last entry was on June 25, 1940; that the
two names appeared to have been typed on two different
typewriters. (Tr. 51)
With regard to a sale of property that was made in
about 1952 and the contract therefor placed in the bank
for collection, Mr. Booth testified that the testator said
he wanted the proceeds of the sale to go to Violet I. Brock.
Violet I. Brock is the same as Violet Manila Ingram.
(Tr. 26)
Mrs. Leora Belliston testified that she and her family
rented part of the home of John William Ingram from
1936 until May of 1941. She testified that she witnessed
the signing of the Nephi Irrigation Company Water Certificates, Exhibits 4 and 5, on May 28, 1940. (Transcript
34, 35) She said that "He had been quite sick a while be-
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fore that, that same winter he had been awfully sick with
the flu, and he was feeling a little bit better when he had
these papers made out.'' (Tr. 35, 36) She said that J. W.
Ingram ''said he was getting all the water stock fixed up
so there wouldn't no no trouble about it"; (Tr. 36) That
several times right around the same period of time, she
had conversations with Mr. Ingram regarding his property in which the subject of the disposition of his property was discussed. (Tr. 36, 37) That "he said he was
having it all fixed up, he was going to get his deeds fixed
in Smith's kid's names and that he had them recorded."
(Tr. 37) That at different times he mentioned all of the
names of Smith Ingram's children, ~ianila, Donna, Earl,
Blaine, and Kenneth. He further told her ''he was having
it fixed for his (Smith's) kids, having it fixed up so nobody else could touch it." (Tr. 38) Mrs. Belliston related
that the testator had told her they had some trouble one
time and so he changed the name of Blanche on a life insurance policy, that the policy had been on (in) Nila and
Blanche; that Blanche was a niece of testator, the daughter of one of the ojectors and appellants herein. (Tr.
37-9) As to the actions of Smith's children toward John
W. Ingram during that period, Mrs. Belliston testified,
''Yes, they treated him nice. When he was sick, they
would come there and get him and see if he needed
anything." "They came many times to his home"; that
:\[r. and ~ln;;. Smith Ingram came to the home and would
bring tT. \V. Ingram something to eat and fix for him,
bringing laundry, ironing, clothes, canned and bottled
fruit (Tr. 41); that shl· did not recall of observing anyone other than Smith Ingram and his wife and children
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visiting with John William Ingram. (Tr. 41) With respect to statements made by Mr. Ingram as to what was
and what was not to be done with his property, Mrs. Belliston testified, "Well, he told me that he had his all
made out to Smith's kids and had his deeds recorded."
(Tr. 44)
Mrs. Louise Ingram, sister-in-law of John William
Ingram and mother of the proponents, testified that during the spring of 1940 Will Ingram had a sick spell, flu,
and that during that period her children were frequent
visitors to his home; that she and the children administered to his needs and wants during the year and prior
thereto. (Tr. 64) That during that time J. W. Ingram
called at her home and told her and her husband "he
hadn't been feeling well, and he had fixed up his property,
he had made his deeds out and fixed his will'' ( Tr 65) ; that
he had written to Mrs. Ingram's daughter Manila at
Green River and explained everything to her and what
she should do; that he had everything fixed up the way
he wanted it to go, and that there wouldn't be any trouble
or anything else to follow; that he had everything fixed,
and that he had left it to my (Mrs. Smith Ingram's) children (Tr. 66). She testified further that he used to say
quite a few times that he had it all fixed up so that no
one else could get it, because he wanted it to go to them,
my children. (Tr. 67) She related that "one time he
came out and we were talking about flowers, and he said
his sister Olive had a plant that she would like- that he
would like, and I said, 'Why don't you go get it, go ask
for it.' And he said 'Oh, I haven't spoken to her for
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eleven years' ''; that that sister lived about a block from
him (Tr. 67)
Violet Manila Ingram Brock identified the three documents, Exhibits 1, 2 and 6, as being written wholly in
the handwriting of John William Ingram, and that the
same were dated and signed by him and were received
by her from him. That she received letters quite often
from her uncle, John William Ingram. (Tr. 70, 72, 73, 74)
Bonnie Ingram Holm, a niece and proponent herein,
related, as set forth, that as she came back into Uncle
Will's hospital ward, he was handing Nila some papers,
and said ''Now, these are for you and Blain. Take care of
them." (Tr. 90) She also said that "we grew up with the
idea that what he had would be ours, and he always told
us it was up to Nila and Blain to do it, to-"; (Tr. 91) that
those papers and the other property of Uncle Will's were
to be kept for distribution to all of the children in a fair
manner. (Tr. 92)
.Appellant states as a fact that "all of the brothers
and sisters of the testator except said M. S. Ingram
oppose the admission of the documents to probate as a
will and oppose the appointment of M. S. Ingram as administrator with will annxed." (Tr. 1-2) The record
shows on examination of appellant and cross-petitioner,
i\1 rs. :Maggie Coulson:
Q.

Have you been requested by all of your brothers and
sisters save and except Smith Ingram to petition for
the position as administratrix of this estate 1
6
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A~

No I haven't.

Q.

Haven't they asked

A.

No.

Q.

Your brother Hugh did, didn't

A.

Yes, and you did (Mr. Tanner).

Q.

Did the other two make any expression directly to

you~

he~

you~

A.

No.

Q.

Have they made an expression of dissatisfaction with
your brother Smith~

A.

I haven't heard of any because I haven't been
around.

Q.

You haven't talked with them.

A.

I haven't. (Tr. 107-8)

The appellant (or appellants) did not challenge the
fitness of M. S. Ingram to be and act as administrator.
The objection was he would not try to take certain money
and property away from his children which Will Ingram
gave to them.
Concerning her own view about the estate of Will
Ingram, or recovering property for the estate, she testified (Tr. 102, 103) :
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Q.

You want to be appointed administratrix of the estate of Will Ingram for the purpose of suing someone
for some property1

A.

No, sir.

Q.

You don't 1 You don't want to sue anyone for any
property1

~\.

No, sir, I don't.

(~.

Is it your brother that wants to

....-\..

I don't have any knowledge of that.

Q.

Is it your nieces or nephews who want to sue?

.A.

I have no knowledge of that.

Q.

But you don't have any knowledge of any property
in your brother Will's estate, do you?

A.

No.

Q.

So far as you know there isn't any.

~\.

Well, I know he had some.

Q.

That was years ago?

A.

rrhat "·as about thirty years ago, before I left Nephi.

Q.

And you haven't been acquainted with any assets or
any property since that time?
8

sue~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A.

Q.

No.
And so that you haven't made any investigation of
your own to determine what if any assets there are of
this estate'

A.

No. (Tr 102-3)
THE FINDINGS

From all of the evidence the court found, among
other things, as appears from the Order Admitting Will
to Probate and Appointing Administrator with the Will
Annexed:
1. That the documents filed herein, respectively
dated May 21, 1940 (Exhibit 1) and November 28, 1944
(Exhibit 6) were entirely written, dated and signed by
said John William Ingram. (Findings 1 and 8; Tr.
7, 21, 22)
2. That at the time of writing and signing said documents, the said John William Ingram intended thereby
to direct disposition of his property or some portions
thereof after his death. (Findings 2, 9, 12)
3. The court also found that the decedent had testamentary capacity, and there was no revocation of the
testamentary dispositions. (Findings 3, 10)
ARGUMENT
The points raised by appellants are of such nature
that comments about particular points will be pertinent
to the other points as well.
9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Respondents agree with the appellants that on or
about :.May 28, 1940, testator executed and delivered warranty deeds to two of the respondents, of all of his real
property. We differ with appellants that there were substantial bank accounts and receivables left by testator as
part of his estate. The findings of the court do not sustain appellants' contention.
On May 21, 1940, the testator wrote a letter in his
own handwriting, dated, and signed by him, advising that
he was fixing up his poperty in the only way it will stand;
that he was '' 'deading' it to you (his niece) but reserve
the right to control it 'til I die but iff I half to sell part
of it to live on you would half to sign the deeds which I
hope you will be willing to do. And what ever is left I
want you to divide equilly with Earl-Bonie and Kennie
and Blain and your self this way none of the other can do
any thing iff I left the deads not recorded till I die then
they could stop you from recording them and come for
their share and besides Alice has come back. And if she is
here when I go giYe her enought money to take her back
are go where she pleases. I am sending the deads to you
then you can send them back to the recorder and have
them recorded. then send them back to me and I will put
them in a safety box in at the bank in your and my name
with other property and things of value I wish that I
could talk to you. * * * ''
Later a sale of the ranch was made with approval of
said niece and a sale of part of the property in Nephi,
Utah, with approval of Blain Ingram. (Tr. 26, 43) The
10
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testator used money therefrom during the rest of his life
for his needs. It is the residue of these funds, the appellants seek to have declared a part of testator's estate; and
to use known assets of the estate to acquire the same.
We agree with the appellants that the deeds to said
niece and the nephew, Blain Ingram, were executed, delivered and recorded on or shortly following May 28,
1940. (App. Brief 17, 27)
POINT I
THE PROPONENTS SUSTAINED THEIR
BURDEN OF PROOF.
In Point I appellants claim that the proponents have
failed to sustain some special burden of proof and overcome some presumption, and then ci'ted 54 A.L.R., 932 in
support of the claims made, in the case of informal instruments, such as a letter, not purporting on its face to
be a will. It was then stated as being the rule in California and other states.
In this connection, it is interesting to note that the
California Supreme Court did not allow any such rule
or requirement to prevent a holding that a 24-word sentence ont of a 700-word letter constituted a testamentary
disposition. The sentence was as follows: "You can have
the house on 25th Ave. and all the things of value so you
won't be out any money on buying me." The Court also
held that the fact the word ""·ill" was not mentioned in
the letter did not disprove writer's intention to make testamentary disposition. In re Button's Estate, 1930, California, 287 Pac. 964.
11
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The able trial judge who sat in this case participated
in the recent Utah Supreme Court case, In re Swan's Estate, 4 U. 2d 277, 293, P. 2d 682. In that case this Court
stated, page 684:
''A will contest being an action at law, we are
bound by the trial court's findings unless such
findings are unreasonable in view of all of the
evidence and all reasonable inference therefrom
when considered in the light most favorable to
supporting the judgment.''
Such case (Swan) fully treats the questions of presump.
tions. We submit that the trial court had that decision in
mind and correctly applied the rules of law to the evidence in this case.
In passing, it is interesting to note that in this case
there was evidence that testator considered that he had
made a "will." (Tr. 65) Further, the evidence is abundant that testator intended to make ultimate disposition
of his property upon death, that he was thinking of the
final disposition and distribution of his property upon
death, and that such matter was in his mind at the time
of writing the letter, Exhibit 1.
POINTS II, III AXD IY.
POTXTS II AXD I I - THE EYIDEXCE
SUSTAIN"ED THE FIXDlXGS OF TESTA1\t!ENTARY INTENT "\YITH RESPECT TO
EXHIBITS 1 AND 6.
POINT IV - LETTER OF NOVEMBER
28, 1954, VIEWED WITH SURROUNDING
12
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FACTS AND CIRCUJ\!ISTANCES IS CAPABLE OF BEING ADMINISTERED AS A
CODICIL TO A WILL.
That all of the formal requirements of the statute
with regard to olographic wills were complied with has
not been questioned by appellants. No contention was
ever made that the testator did not intend that the four
children, the proponents herein, should receive the whole
of testator's property upon his passing. This Court, in
view of the findings of the trial court, which findings are
amply supported by the evidence, is not going to permit
the amply proven intention of testator to be thwarted by
the very people who were intended to be deprived of all
benefit from testator's estate, in violation of the express
and clear intention of testator.
That the testator took action in two different ways
and at two different times to accomplish his purpose,
such action not being inconsistent and being pursuant to
and consistent with common and good legal practice,
should only serve to fortify and aid the Court in accomplishing testator's intentions. As this Court said in
Johnson's Estate, 1924, 65 Utah 114, 228 Pac. 748, at
page 749,
"The intention of the testator is the ultimate object to be kept in mind and to which all rules must
yield." (In re Poppleton's Est. 34 U. 285, 97 P.
138) and is the polar star which should guide the
court in its decision. (In re Campbell 27 U. 361,
75 Pac. 851; Rumel v. Solomon, 54 U. 25, 180 Pac.
419.)
13
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In Murphy's Estate, 71 Pac. (2d) 6, the Washington
Supreme Court said at page 11 :
"The fact that an instrument of doubtful character is invalid if regarded as a conveyance, while
valid if regarded as a will, has been referred to
as a ground for regarding it as a will, and conversely, the fact that an instrument is invalid if
regarded as a will has been considered a ground
for regarding it as a conveyance. This view is
based partly upon the policy of the courts to give
to an instrument a legal operation wherever possible and partly upon the consideration that the
maker of the instrument must have intended it to
operate in the mode in which he rendered it capable of operating. 2 Tiffany Real Property (2nd
Ed.) 1813, 4. Key 467 ; Read on Wills ( 2d Ed)
69 (Key) 75."
Appellant seems to emphasize that all of testator's
property was disposed of by gifts inter vivos in order to
avoid probate. It was most reasonable for testator, on
May 21, 1940, to provide by will for the disposition of his
property and shortly thereafter to make conveyances to
save expenses of probate. Testator told Mrs. Louise Ingram that he had made a will (Tr. 65), and the fact that
he later executed deeds did not change the nature of the
instrument he considered to be a will. Delivery of a will
is not a prerequisite to its validity.
It is significant at this point also to observe that in
the letter, Exhibit 1, the last part, it is provided:
'' ,, • • I am sending the deeds to you then you can
send them back to me and I will put them in a
safety box in at the bank in your and my name

14
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with other property and things of value * * * "
(Italics supplied)
It is apparent that the letter was to apply to more
than just the deeds. The evidence is abundant that it was
the intention of John William Ingram that his nieces and
nephews, the proponents herein, should receive all of his
property. Such intention was disclosed to the children
themselves, to their parents, to his friends and associates;
and in no instance was there a scintilla of evidence to
show a contrary intent. By whatever means that intent
was to be accomplished, it is clear that testator considered it to have been done.
It is submitted that the writing of an olographic will,
as in this case, was an adequate means, and that such intention was accomplished in fact and law.
The respectable authority cited by appellants, page
23, Page on Wills, Lifetime Edition, contains a provision
so pertinent to the facts of this case as to be worthy of
repetition, ''Section 46. Intention to Make Will - Use
of the Word 'Will' '':
''Animus testandi does not necessarily mean
that the word 'will' or 'testament' must be used in
the transaction. A man may make his will animo
testandi, though he is so ignorant of law that he
thinks it is called a deed or contract; or though he
does not know what to call it. The test is not what
he thinks is the legal name of the instrument
which he is executing, but what its legal effect is
in view of its nature, and of the real intention of
the maker as deduced from the instrument and
from all facts and circumstances. The fact that

15
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'
'
'I

the testamentary provisions form a very small
part of the entire document, the bulk of which is
not intended to operate as a will, does not make
such small part of the instrument inoperative as a
will.
*
*
*
*
' 'The animus testandi, then, does not turn on
the presence or absence of the words 'will' or 'testament,' but on the intention of the testator as
shown by the nature of the instrument and the
surrounding facts and circumstances." (Italics
supplied.)
The surrounding facts and circumstances and the
evidence thereof, in this case are clear beyond dispute or
question that it was the intention of the testator that the
proponents, those nieces and nephews named in the letter
of May 21, 1940, Exhibit 1, were intended by testator to
receive all of his property, and that none of it was to "go
to the sisters and brothers and they never done me any
good.'' He had not even spoken to one of the sisters for
over eleven years, and she lived just a block away. ( Tr.
67) And the witness who lived in part of testator's house,
in whom he confided and who was chosen by testator as a
witness to his signature on the water stock certificates
(Exhibits 8 and 9), and which witness was unprejudiced,
had nothing to gain in the premises - such witness testified that she did not recall observing anyone other than
Smith Ingram and his wife and children visiting with
John \Yilliam Ingram. (Tr. 41)
It is obvious from the express findings made by the
Trial Judge that the evidence presented by proponents
was believed. It is clear, further, that all of the technical

16
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requirements were met in the two instruments, Exhibits
1 and 6, to constitute them as the last will and testament
of testator and a codicil thereto. The evidence and circumstances are sufficiently clear to enable the court to
determine the wishes of testator with respect to Exhibit
6, the codicil, without conjecture. As is said in Jones
on Evidence, Civil Cases, Fourth Edition, Volume 2, Sec.
475, page 907,
''The court puts itself in the place of the person who executed the writing, in so far as that is
possible, for the purpose of construing the will
and determining the meaning of the words. Evidence of the surrounding facts may be shown on
the issue as to due execution.
"While proof of the circumstances, situation
and surroundings of the testator and of his property is admissible in order to place the court in the
situation of the testator and thus to enable the
court to understand the meaning and application
of his language . . . ''
There was not
herein one scintilla
with the intentions
with the intentions

introduced by appellants, objectors,
of evidence which was inconsistent
expressed in the writing itself and
expressed by testator to others.

The codicil to any will may be construed in connection with the will itself, and with the surrounding circumstances. By so doing, and which the Trial Court did, the
objection raised by appellant in Point IV is obviated. It
is unnecessary to point out that such Point IV attempts
to treat the codicil as the will itself.

17
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I~

Referring again to Page on Wills, Lifetime Edition,
in Section 54, at page 122, there are some pertinent provisions:
''A will is not to be declared void for uncertainty if the intention of the testator can be determined from the will as interpreted by admissible
evidence of the relations of parties and of the surrounding facts and circumstances.
''A rough memorandum which discloses testamentary intent is good, though extrinsic evidence
may be necessary to identify the beneficiaries and
the subject-matter."
And at page 142, sentence 6:
''If the instrument, on its face, shows that it
was drawn by an inexperienced or illiterate layman, it will be construed all the more liberally
than if it had been drawn by an expert.''
Reference in appellants' brief to "public policy for
the avoidance of fraud" is considered to be uncalled for
and directs attention to the testimony of the representative of the objectors, appellants herein (Transcript 100
to 108), and to the a·bundance of evidence as to the clear
intention and desires of testator which would be thwarted
by reversing the decision of the trial court herein.
When the testator wrote ''Dear N nese'' and handed
the writing to Manila Brock and said "these papers are
yours and Blains-take care of them,' ' it certainly was a
designation of the person to whom it was addressed. As
a codicil to the first letter it is made definite and certain
the persons to whom he referred by ''Divide * * • these
equil."
18
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The oral evidence adduced of all the witnesses is
clear as to whom the testator designated as his beneficiaries. Such an application is made of similar facts 1n
54 A.L.R. at page 919.
We are unable to see that the Utah case of Jensen's
Estate, 37 U. 428, 108 P. 927, referred to in the appellant's brief has any persuasive authority to this case.
No attack as such is made by the appellants upon the
findings of the court, that they are not supported by the
evidence; although recitation of some of the facts are
made therein from which it appears it might have been so
contended. We submit that all of the surrounding circumstances are proper as part of the consideration by
the court to make its findings; and being amply supported
by the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom,
the findings must stand.
CONCLUSIONS

It is submitted that the appeal should be denied and
dismissed; the Order Admitting Will to Probate and Appointing Administrator with the Will Annexed is supported by the fiindings, the evidence and reasonable
inferences therefrom, and should be affirmed, with costs
to respondent.
Respectfully submitted,
EKS AYN ANDERSON
711 X ewhouse Building,
UDELL R. JENSEN
Nephi, Utah
Attorneys for Respondents
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